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Mathematics without formulas?1
Willi Dörfler
Introduction
Beyond the trivial observation that signs of many
kinds play a central role in all mathematical ac-
tivities I will give a more far reaching motivation
and justification for the relevance of semiotic theories
within mathematics education. This has to do with
a widespread tendency – at least in my view – in
school mathematics to marginalize mathematical
operations and calculations be they arithmetical,
algebraic or geometric. I will first describe the main
features of that tendency and then try to point out
arguments against it deriving from semiotic posi-
tions proposed by Peirce and Wittgenstein. This
will also show the relevance of theories and theo-
retical positions for the practice of mathematical
education which without such sound foundations
is in danger to go astray and to follow ideological
fashions.
Meaning of signs
One central task in teaching mathematics at all
levels is to offer the learners the opportunity to de-
velop and construct meaning and understanding
for the respective mathematics and especially for
the signs and symbols used therein. Now there is
the orthodox and classic view that signs gain their
meaning from the objects they stand for, which
they designate. From this designation and refer-
ence also the rules for the manipulation of the signs
and symbols derive and are thereby also justified.
For school mathematics this conviction leads to two
different ways of methodological approaches to de-
velop meaning in mathematics education. One is of
an empiricist character and the other of an idealistic
one. Thereby I do not assert that all of mathematics
teaching falls into one of these two categories or
a combination of them. Yet, I see a strong empha-
sis in school on basic orientations which can be
subsumed under these labels and which is to the
detriment of what one could call “formal” mathe-
matics.
Empiricist foundation
The empiricist orientation intends to convey mean-
ing in mathematics via what one can call every day
applications. The use of mathematics for describ-
ing practical and non-mathematical situations and
processes and for solving the respective problems
is the focus of teaching and learning and foremost
of the tasks presented to the learners. In a way,
one wants to import meaning into mathematics
from outside of mathematics thereby possibly con-
founding meaning and relevance. Without those
references to concrete objects the signs and symbols
of mathematics (like the numerals of arithmetic or
the letters of algebra) and the operations with them
are said to be meaningless.
Looking at the tasks posed one can realize some
other features characteristic for this approach. In
many of them very little to none calculations are
needed for solving the task or those can be dele-
gated to a computer. The emphasis in the tasks is
on the one hand on the process of model building
and on the other hand on a variety of completely
non-mathematical questions. These are concerned
with economical, ecological, social or humanistic as-
pects or with questions from the respective context
(like say biology, physics, technology, etc.). The stu-
dents are urged to discuss those aspects but mostly
in a way divorced from mathematics or not in need
of mathematics. For sure, there are also discussions
about the role played by mathematics and about the
appropriateness of mathematical modelling. But
for all that usually little knowledge of the mathe-
matics is a prerequisite and calculations mostly can
be avoided more or less completely.
Also more comprehensive projects are staged
in the same vein which necessitate cooperation of
several students. All that is not bad in itself and of
course much is to be learned in this way, yet very
little about mathematics itself, its notions and oper-
ations. One must also take into account the strict
time constraints of school teaching to see that such
an approach with a lot of discussion and group
work leaves little room for anything else. Mathemat-
ics so to say is dissolved into its applications.
Discussing modelling
The situation is in my view even exacerbated by
the phenomenon that there can be observed a fur-
ther shift beyond the one described so far (from
doing mathematics to using and applying it): many
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tasks demand not just to carry out and justify a
modelling process but to focus on discussing that
process itself. That again is a shift from doing to
discussing or to simply talking. One even finds
test items of this quality. This goes under headings
like: awareness, responsibility, consciousness, abil-
ity for rational judgment. There is apparently the
pedagogical conviction that one can sensibly talk
about mathematics and its ramifications without
having experiences with doing mathematics. And
one finds the outspoken opinion that the students
in school should not learn mathematics as such and
its operations but learn rather about mathematics,
its uses in society and the appropriateness thereof.
Ideas instead of calculations
This shift from mathematics proper to the meta-
level of talk about mathematics is also significant
with the second tendency which I will discuss now
rather shortly. It shows itself in notions like “fun-
damental” ideas among which one finds: number,
measure, approximation, linearity, probability, func-
tion. And similar to what we found in the em-
piricist context again here is a strong negligence
and even disregard for the role to be played by the
various mathematical sign systems and notations.
The mathematical signs and symbols function only
to express ideas and the latter come first, it is said;
and the situation is compared to music composition
where purportedly the music comes first and the
score only in the hindsight denotes and communi-
cates the former. The students must therefore be
acquainted with the ideas first which can only be
done in a rather loose and imprecise way.
The mathematical notations are downplayed as
secondary. To understand the “big” ideas no rou-
tine or experience with mathematical operations
is needed, it is assumed, and the ideas as such
convey a deeper understanding of mathematics as
it is possible to be attained by carrying out typi-
cal mathematical operations like solving equations,
calculating an integral or devising a proof.
Truncation of mathematics
Both positions could be seen as avoiding or
marginalizing the use of and the manipulation of
mathematical formulas possibly in a trial to make
mathematics more palatable and less frightening.
But, the “formula” and its formal uses is one of
the great inventions of mathematics. Thus those
tendencies lead to a far reaching truncation of math-
ematics in the school. That this really is a kind of
threat is borne out by the views of two very promi-
nent philosophers who have devoted much of their
thinking to mathematics and mathematical reason-
ing.
Charles Sanders Peirce
I will start with the American philosopher, logician
and mathematician Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-
1914) and his notions of diagram and diagrammatical
reasoning. Of course what follows is only a very
rough sketch! In Peirce diagrams are among oth-
ers arithmetic and algebraic terms and formulas,
equations, geometric figures, graphics, formulas
of all kind, for short all relevant mathematical in-
scriptions or sign systems. And for all systems of
(mathematical) diagrams there are rules for their
manipulation which is a general form of calcula-
tion. The main assertion by Peirce now is that
mathematical thinking of all kinds from simple cal-
culations to complex proofs essentially consists in
the manipulation and transformation and in the
invention of diagrams which latter thereby do not
express anything which is outside of the diagrams.
In a pointed way Peirce says that mathematical rea-
soning occurs on the paper where the diagrams
are written. Convincing examples show that this
diagrammatic reasoning is wholly self-contained
and that it lends to mathematics a great autonomy
based on the structure of the diagrams and the re-
spective operation rules. Understanding mathematics
then can and even must be equated with diagrammatic
experience and fluency in diagrammatic reasoning which
to a great extent is based on formulas including those of
a geometric character.
Here one realizes the gulf between the views
of Peirce and the tendencies sketched above! This
becomes very transparent when one looks at a draft
by Peirce for a text book of elementary arithmetic
which bases the learning of it on diagrammatic ac-
tivities like ways of moving forth and back in the
number sequence. Peirce also says that mathemat-
ical development in general and in the individual
as well is constituted by the invention, construction
or acquisition of systems of diagrams. To learn
mathematics depends on learning diagrams and
the operations with them. This also holds for the
applications of mathematics where diagrams are
used as signs (i.e. models) for structures outside of
mathematics.
Ludwig Wittgenstein
The Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1889–1951) even was more radical with regard to
the central role of signs for mathematics and math-
ematical activities. Thereby he is concerned with
mathematics proper or “pure” mathematics. Yet
he says that mathematics derives importance and
relevance from its every day applications but does
not receive meaning from outside. The meaning of
the mathematical signs and symbols resides in their use
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within mathematics, i.e. in the manifold operations with
them in calculations of all sorts and especially in proofs.
For making this view more transparent Wittgen-
stein has proposed the notion of a language game
or more specifically for mathematics that of a sign
game. In a game like chess the meaning of the
figures is determined by the rules of the game and
likewise the meaning of the mathematical symbols
is tantamount to the operation rules and all of their
consequences. Thus he says that in a mathematical
argument one cannot appeal to the meaning of the
terms since this meaning is only developed within
mathematics. A simple conclusion would then be
that learning mathematics consists in genuinely
and progressively taking part in the respective sign
games. More specifically, learning arithmetic means
learning to calculate and solve arithmetic problems
of all sort. Likewise this holds for algebra and any
other part of (school) mathematics. To understand
what a mathematical term means is equated with
the ability to use it in a correct way, i.e. according
to the respective rules for operation.
This is a strong argument for a kind of mathe-
matical training which possibly is analogous to the
training necessary for becoming a fairly good chess
player: to understand chess simply consists in being
able to play it well. Wittgenstein also proposes the
view that the signs of mathematics do not designate
given objects like numbers from which their mean-
ing derives. Here again the analogy with chess
might help: a figure of chess, say the queen, does
not designate anything. Thus fundamental ideas
do not by themselves elucidate the mathematical
use of signs and possibly it is the other way round
that the big ideas can only be understood from
their instantiations within mathematics by formal
models e.g. of linearity. Of course do have many
mathematical sign games their genetic roots in prac-
tical problems. But they cannot be reduced to them
and they always essentially transcend them. This
becomes very clear already in the case of negative
and of rational numbers.
Summarizing
To sum up: the positions taken by Peirce and
Wittgenstein strongly oppose the current tendency
to reduce or to neglect the role of symbolic mathe-
matical activity. Even if the goal of school mathe-
matics is rather the applications and a more general
and superficial knowledge about some features of
mathematics this goal will only be achievable when
a genuine understanding of the mathematics in-
volved is developed. And such an understanding
according to Peirce and Wittgenstein presupposes
familiarity with the mathematical diagrams and/or
with the mathematical sign games. In other words,
there is no sensible mathematics without formulas.
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„Digitale Bildung“ — ein Bildungskonzept?
Horst Hischer
Kein Mensch lernt digital. Es gibt weder digitalen Unterricht noch digitale Bildung [. . . ].
Ralf Lankau, 2017
Ausgangslage
„Digitalisierung“ ist in aller Munde. So überboten
sich in den Wochen vor der letzten Bundestags-
wahl viele Parteien mit oft dubios bleibenden Pa-
rolen zur Forcierung einer vorgeblich notwendigen
„Digitalisierung“, als deren – höflich formuliert: –
bedenklichste hier „Digital first. Bedenken second.“
genannt sei.
Aber auch im Kontext von Bildung, Schule, Bil-
dungspolitik und Didaktik finden wir – in den letz-
ten Jahren zunehmend, nun auch bis in die tages-
politische Berichterstattung von Presse und Fernse-
hen hinein – Fokussierungen auf „Digitalisierung“,
die nun sogar Forderungen z. B. nach „Digitaler
Bildung“ und „Digitalem Lernen“ nach sich zie-
hen. Und die Gesellschaft für Didaktik der Mathematik
(GDM) hat im Juli 2017 ein Positionspapier veröf-
fentlicht, bei dem es expressis verbis u. a. auch um
„digitale Bildung“ geht. 1
Aber können denn „Bildung“ und „Lernen“ di-
gital sein? Wurde das bei der Wortwahl sorgsam
1 ojs.didaktik-der-mathematik.de/index.php/mgdm/article/view/59/205
